Phenomenality and Intentionality: A Phenomenological Problem

Traces intentionality from Brentano's revival of the idea through Husserl, Heidegger and later phenomenologists. A compact map of how the central concept of phenomenology developed.

Dermot Moran

A textbook chapter that explains Husserl's theory of intentionality from the ground up: mental acts, their content, the noema and how consciousness reaches its objects.

Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith

Examines how Husserl took over Brentano's concept of intentionality and solved its problems with the idea of the noema, and compares it with Frege's theory of sense.

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao Jr.

Defends Husserl's view that there is no intentionality without lived experience against the criticisms of Wittgenstein, Ryle and their followers.

Uwe Meixner

A master's thesis on cognitive phenomenology, the question of whether thinking itself has a felt character, and what that means for intentionality.

Gábor Matula